Life on the West Island - Defence is the best means of defence

Highly experienced West Island analyst Albert Palazzo retired from the Department of Defence in 2019. He was the long-serving Director of War Studies for the Australian Army. Now, he has entered the debate about the best way to fashion our defence strategy in the national interest. This week, Palazzo wrote a definitive essay in The Conversation setting out his rationale and recommendations for how to best shape the nation’s defence forces.

Palazzo calls for a complete rethink of the way we can best secure our national security by abandoning the old cliché that “the best form of defence is attack,” which has resulted in our involvement in a series of wars which had little or nothing to do with our national security. He explains his underlying rationale as follows:

For more than a century, Australia has followed the same defence policy: dependence on a great power. This was first the United Kingdom and then the United States. Without properly considering other options, successive federal governments have intensified this policy with the AUKUS agreement and locked Australia into dependency on the US for decades to come.

A more imaginative and innovative government would have investigated different ways to achieve a strong and independent national defence policy. One that, for instance, didn’t require Australia to surrender its sovereignty to a foreign power. Nor require the acquisition of fabulously expensive nuclear-powered submarines and the building of overpriced, under-gunned surface warships, such as the Hunter frigates.

In fact, in an age of rapidly improving uncrewed systems, Australia does not need any crewed warships or submarines at all. Instead, we should lean into a military philosophy that I describe in my upcoming book, The Big Fix: Rebuilding Australia’s National Security. This is known as the “strategic defensive”.

The strategic defensive is a method of waging war employed throughout history, although the term’s use only dates to the early 19th century. It doesn’t require a state to defeat its attacker. Rather, the state must deny the aggressor the ability to achieve their objectives.

The strategic defensive best suits “status quo states” like Australia. The people of status quo states are happy with what they have. Their needs can be met without recourse to intimidation or violence. These states also tend to be militarily weak relative to potential aggressors and aren’t aggressors themselves. In short: if war eventuates, Australia’s only goal is to prevent a change to the status quo. In this way, strategic defensive would suit very well as the intellectual foundation of Australia’s security policy.

In essence, Palazzo explains that the best form of defence is not attack, but defence. He points out that military history and lived experience show that it is much easier to defend ground, air and sea space than it is to capture it. If that is the case, building of military forces and equipment should reflect the need to defend, possibly against much stronger forces. He says that all aggressors must attack into the unknown, bringing their support with them. Defenders, by contrast, can fall back onto a known space and the provisions it can supply. And the wide water moat surrounding our Australian continent greatly complicates and increases the cost of any aggressor’s effort to harm us.

This obviously requires a complete change in thinking by those framing our national security and in the sorts of military equipment purchased:

We could use weapons now available to enhance the inherent power of being the defending side. Its task need only be making any attack prohibitively expensive, in terms of equipment and human life.

Long-range strike missiles and drones, combined with sensors, provide the defending nation with the opportunity to create a lethal killing zone around it. This is what China has done in the East and South China Seas. We can do the same by integrating missiles, drones and uncrewed maritime vessels with a sensor network linked to a command-control-targeting system.

Missiles and drones are a better buy when compared to the nuclear-powered submarines Australia hopes to acquire from the United States, as well as the warships – including more submarines – the government plans to build in the Osborn and Henderson shipyards. And most importantly, they are available now.

Palazzo believes that the West Island has no need for nuclear submarines to patrol distant waters, such as the South China Sea. He also points out that we can only afford a handful of very expensive AUKUS subs, so that they would not have any meaningful deterrent value. By contrast, missiles and drones are vastly cheaper, meaning we can buy them in the thousands.

In conclusion, Palazzo clarifies the reasons behind his call for a total rethink of West Island defence and national security policies:

It is clear Australian leaders have decided to intensify Australia’s dependence on the US rather than seeking to create a military capable of securing the nation on our own . The cost is nigh-on ruinous in terms of not just money, but also the entanglement in foreign-led wars and potential reputational loss. Perhaps worst of all, the nation is making itself into a target – possibly a nuclear target – if war between the US and China was to eventuate.

This need not have been the outcome of the government’s recent defence reviews. But it’s not too late to rethink. By adopting a different military philosophy as the guide for its security decision-making, Australia could manage its security largely on its own. This only requires leaders with a willingness to think differently.

This all sounds like common sense. But are West Island leaders, and the wider community, ready to develop and implement strategies based on the concept that defence is the best means of defence?